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FOREWORD
The crisis of the Cuban revolution has once again raised a
number of security issues for the United States, along with
important questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of the
three- decade-old U.S. policy of containment and punishment. Many
observers believe that the Castro regime is in its final hour,
and that its passing may be accompanied by massive bloodshed and
a new wave of refugees to southern Florida.
Given the potential explosiveness of the Cuban crisis and
the possibility that it might lead to U.S. military involvement,
it would seem appropriate to take a closer look at the Cuban
situation. In particular, we need a better understanding of those
forces promoting both political stability and instability. In
this report, the distinguished Latin American scholar Enrique
Baloyra argues that Castro's current policy of "re-equilibration"
is unlikely to succeed and that his options will increasingly
boil down to two choices: One, he can deepen the process of
government-led reform, or, two, he can continue the current
policy, with growing chances of violence and turmoil. Baloyra
suggests that since the former might jeopardize his hegemonic
position, the latter is the more probable option. The future, in
short, is likely to be grim.
This report is an expanded and refined version of an earlier
paper that was presented at an SSI roundtable on "Cuba and the
Future," held at the U.S. Army War College. That session was
organized by Dr. Donald E. Schulz and funded by the U.S. Army War
College Strategic Outreach Program under the leadership of
Colonel John D. Auger.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
report as a contribution to understanding events in this
important region.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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WHERE DOES CUBA STAND?
A Riddle.
Is Cuba different? Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall in
November 1989, and particularly since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union in summer 1991, predictions about the imminent
collapse of the Castro regime have been more frequent.1 Scholars
and qualified analysts agree that the regime confronts its worst
crisis ever and that it can not possibly escape it unscathed.2 By
this they do not mean that the regime will inevitably fall, only
that to avoid more catastrophic alternatives, including
widespread violence or outright civil war, the historic
revolutionary leadership must innovate considerably more than it
has ever been willing to. Indeed, it appeared that to prevent a
complete national collapse that would destroy the regime, the
leadership had already introduced changes that it would normally
have refused to even consider.
If the Cuban leadership is acting under duress, why have we
not witnessed more dramatic developments? If social and economic
conditions are so harsh and growing worse, why have people not
gone into the street to march and protest? Why are we yet to
witness domestic political opposition effectively challenging the
regime? Why have the leaders in the so-called left-wing of the
Cuban Communist Party refrained from expressing their criticisms
and disagreements in public? Why have the armed forces apparently
remained loyal? Is Cuba unique?3
Some could argue that the Cuban system of domination is so
perfect, so omnipresent and so omnipotent that, as many of the
characters in the plays of Vaclav Havel claimed, "There is no
alternative but to submit." Others would claim that the regime
still enjoys a fair amount of foundational legitimacy and that
the government is firmly in control of the situation and capable
of experimenting with ad hoc strategies of re-equilibration.
Which is actually the case?
On Cuban Uniqueness.
For a long time, specialists have dealt with Cuba as a
deviant, almost unique, case. We need to review the factors
making Cuba different, not to drive home the point that it will
remain so--that is, invulnerable to the changes that broke down
other socialist regimes--but to understand how these factors are
retarding the process of change. In very schematic fashion, here
is how five of those factors seem to be operating in the early
1990s.
First, Cuba's insularity and proximity to the United States
have always militated against regime change for a number of
historical and political reasons. These are well-known and do not
require additional elaboration except to point out that they have

allowed the fidelistas to play politics in terms of North-South
(small versus large, independent versus neocolonial) oppositions
and to isolate the Cuban public from external stimuli. In the
Cuban case, North-South contradictions have very profound
historical roots and become specific as a test of strength
between nationalism and imperialism. The result has been that the
more relevant contradiction of Cuban politics in the last four
decades--pitting of an oppressive regime against a dominated
society--has been overlooked and neglected.
Far too frequently, political actors in the United States
address Cuba as a domestic U.S. issue, seek to project power and
influence through American institutions, advance proposals that
ignore the historical antecedents of U.S.-Cuban relations, or
fail to incorporate the nuances of contemporary Cuban politics.
Regardless of the intent, the result is the perception in Cuba
that outside actors want to dictate solutions which, in many
cases, run contrary to the explicit wishes or public positions of
their would-be Cuban allies.
Second, none of the peaceful processes of regime transition
has been determined by external factors. In the 1970s, military
defeat abroad contributed to the deterioration of the Salazarist
regime in Portugal and to the collapse of the colonels' regime in
Greece. Similarly, the defeat in the Falklands unravelled the
Argentine military regime, but only after General Galtieri
committed his government to a gamble of his and his colleagues
own choosing, rather than one that was imposed on them. In
Central Europe, where the USSR instigated the removal of Erich
Honecker in the GDR, helped plot the overthrow of Nicolae
Ceaucescu in Romania, and orchestrated the ouster of Todor Zhikov
in Bulgaria, the Soviets had to act through local intermediaries
who had their own interests and priorities. The outcome of these
interventions was far from uniform. Such intermediaries have not
been available in the Cuban case, and potential local allies have
been unwilling and/or unable to assist in this project. The
United States lacks an effective domestic presence in Cuba and,
for the reasons adduced before, an American connection would
likely be a delegitimizing factor in the eyes of the majority of
the Cuban population, rather than a factor that would increase
the prestige and legitimacy of the opposition. In too many cases,
opponents of the regime, particularly those operating in the
United States, have chosen to highlight their closeness and
support for the Cuba policies of the incumbent administration.
Third, Cuba was a model of national communism which, despite
a heavy reliance and dependence on the Soviet Union, maintained a
degree of independence and autonomy that could not have been
predicted from a cursory inspection of the country's strategic
assets and resource potential. Cuban willingness to experiment in
the delivery of collective goods at home and aggressive pursuit
of proletarian internationalism abroad--including programs of
fraternal economic assistance--preserved the freshness of the
revolutionary experience for a long time. The boredom and despair

of the disaffected coexisted side by side with the optimism and
heightened sense of personal efficacy of the committed. That
sense of efficacy was probably much more widespread in Cuba than
in other socialist countries.
To be sure, the Cuban revolutionaries failed the test of
creating wealth. Nevertheless, they have evolved a winning
competitive ethos yet to be contradicted by military defeat or
catastrophic political setbacks. This ethos stands behind the
arrogance and self-sufficiency of the leading figures of the
regime. In the final analysis, they have a point: They are yet to
be defeated in the political arena. Castro and his closest
associates publicly reacted to the collapse of the socialist
regimes as something that Eastern European leaders had brought
upon themselves.4 They find no fault in their own policies and
insist that they are not to be blamed for the mistakes of their
former comrades.5
In a way, the worst foreign policy defeat, the collapse of
the Soviet Union and its world system of political economy, which
had major domestic political consequences for the Cuban regime,
was not a complete political catastrophe for Castro. This defeat
came precisely at a time of heightening tensions between a Soviet
reformist cohort, younger than the Cuban historic leadership, who
had mounted a major offensive along the lines of transparency in
government (glasnost) and economic restructuring (perestroika).
On their own, each of these objectives had profoundly
destabilizing consequences for the Cuban regime, which not only
resisted these changes but presented its own alternative policies
of rectification.6 Precisely at a time when he was in the
uncomfortable situation of defending Stalinist positions against
what Mikhail Gorbachev had presented as another effort at
Leninist restoration, a worldwide crisis of Leninism ended this
threat against Castro.7
Fourth, another element comes as a direct result of the
effectiveness of the Cuban formula of political domination. Given
the drawbacks of the "totalitarian model" and its shortcomings in
describing the dynamics of life under Communist Party domination,
using what appear to be the more accurate labels to describe this
system is problematic. Basically, in a structural sense, the
contemporary Cuban regime has resembled the Stalinist much more
than any other variety of Leninist regimes. Unfortunately,
Stalinism is a term laden with very strong ideological
implications, linked to a particular worldview (Sovietology) that
was neither a discipline nor scientific, and was at best a
remnant of the cold war. Nevertheless, the absence of civil
society in Cuba cannot be understood except in reference to this
form of communist domination, at least in an institutional way.
As a result, there are no practically autonomous
intermediary institutions in Cuban society. In Cuba, there is no
Christian Church that can mobilize the masses as was the case in
Poland or in the GDR. Despite one of the richest traditions of

unionism anywhere, an independent labor movement such as
Solidarnosc is nowhere in sight in Cuba. In the same vein, in
spite of a few well-publicized rows with the government, Cuban
dissidents and intellectuals have been unable to come together
into anything comparable to Charter 77, the Petofi Circle or the
samizdat movement.8
Absent institutional sanctuaries and social spaces in which
to evolve and camouflage political activity, the atomization that
characterizes Stalinist forms of political control has been
singularly effective in preventing the development of horizontal
solidarities that normally precede the crystallization of
organized forms of public protest. Without continued protest, the
government has not been forced to engage in major exercises of
public repression. The water cannon, the baton, the cattle prods,
the gas canisters, and the gas masks are all ready to be utilized
but they have been unnecessary. Thus far, the government has
found it sufficient to deploy the so-called "rapid reaction
brigades" against actual and suspected dissidents to prevent the
massification of public protests.
This dominance can also be seen at the level of the
political elite. Only three organizations have sufficient
institutional strength to pose serious challenges to the
leadership: the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), the Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FAR), and the Interior Ministry (MININT). In June
1989, the regime demonstrated its strength as it moved publicly
to try to convict one of Cuba's most revered and decorated
military heroes, Division General Arnaldo Ochoa Sánchez. Ochoa
was found guilty and summarily executed along with three other
officers, including Colonel Antonio de la Guardia, a MININT
insider. This would have been inconceivable in most Latin
American countries. Subsequently, a thorough purge gutted out the
MININT, sending the interior minister, Division General José
Abrantes, to jail for 20 years and meting out stiff sentences to
a large number of his colleagues.9 For all practical purposes,
MININT was put under the receivership of the FAR which, as was
the case in other socialist countries, seemed obedient to the
party.10
As for the party itself, some of the worst and most
sensational purges conducted in Cuba--in 1962, 1964, and 1968-were against elements who allegedly were trying to use the party
organization to establish their own political base. More
recently, during the 1980s, party leaders and professional cadre
were under relentless pressure to make government policy work:
Turnover rates in the Central Committee, provincial and municipal
secretariats, and the party bureaucracy reached historic highs.
In 1985, Humberto Perez, chief of the Central Planning Board
(JUCEPLAN) and one of the prime defenders of economic reform, was
demoted from his job and ultimately expelled from the Central
Committee. In early 1992, a similar fate befell ideologist Carlos
Aldana, whose position on change remained ambiguous and whose
rising fortunes quickly faded as he was accused of corruption and

demoted to a menial job.
One final element of paradigmatic nature is uncertainty,
both at the level of the elite and of the attentive public. In
all previous cases of peaceful transition, elite agreements have
paved the way for elections or for agreed-upon rupturas offering
at least minimal guarantees to the those departing the scene. In
a way, a process of transition is a process of managing
uncertainty and, in the Cuban case, the last few years have been
a period of increasing uncertainty. This has gone beyond the fear
of and intimidation by official mechanisms of political control.
Party elites that could have pronounced themselves against the
present political course have yet to receive clear, unmistakable
pledges of non-retribution. They are concerned that U.S. policies
of economic denial through embargo and political ostracism are
geared to bring down the entire apparatus, not just the diehard
Stalinists. They read those policies as intending to destroy
everyone ever associated with the regime. This, to say the least,
has not been helpful. At the level of ordinary citizens, many are
certainly fed up with Castro, with his foolhardy experiments, and
with having to live in permanent dissimulation. But they are not
looking forward to ending 30-odd years of revolution--bearing
little personal freedom but accompanied by a number of tangible
social benefits--only to fall prey to a group of extremists and
arrivistes from the other end of the spectrum.
In short, Cubans are preoccupied about the alternatives to
their present predicament. Elites and masses are deeply worried
about the future. In the past, many had experienced considerable
social mobility and/or had seen their children reach positions
and distinctions that they could not have dreamed of. The rampant
neoliberal rhetoric, the costs of changing economic models in
Central Europe, and the continuing dire economic conditions of
millions of Latin Americans are constantly being highlighted by
official propaganda. In short, the public is not entirely
convinced that life would be better under capitalism.
Why is this important? A generic argument, advanced by Adam
Przeworski among others, is that a crisis of legitimacy does not
change or make a regime.11 There have to be alternative
leadership, policies, and strategies available to mobilize people
in favor of change.12 And change can only come from two
directions: from "above," that is from dissident factions of the
leadership--or from "below," that is from within the ranks of
ordinary Cubans. Once there are leaders willing to lead and
masses available to be mobilized, there can be an alternative.
The Paradox Restated.
To be sure, in the summer of 1993 the Cuban regime was being
bruised by very dire conditions. Judging by historical and
comparative standards, those conditions should at the very least
have produced a deterioration, if not a near breakdown, of the

regime. But Cuban leaders continued formulating and implementing
policy as if they were not confronting a terminal crisis.13
There are three ways of evaluating this paradox. The first
is to consider chaos without breakdown as the normal order of
things in revolutionary Cuba. This proposition rests on three
assumptions: First, the historical continuity of the ruling group
suggests that the Cuban regime has never changed.14 Second, it
has been argued that, except for 1975 through 1984, turmoil,
crises, and experimentation have characterized the operational
style of the Cuban regime. This has been variously described as
socialismo con pachanga and wartime communism (for the 1960s),
sociolismo, provisional institutions in perpetuity, or simply the
"anti-model."15 Third, as has been the case in the past, despite
all the avatars, Fidel Castro and his closest associates may
somehow find the means and opportunity to remain in power without
changing the regime. Each of these statements clearly exaggerates
what may have actually been or shall be the case. The bottom line
of this first option asks: Where except in its depth is the
novelty of this crisis? Are Cubans not accustomed to living in
crisis?
The second option would be to reject the paradox altogether
on grounds that the regime really is deteriorating and that it
cannot possibly continue relying on traditional mechanisms for
reproducing its legitimacy and control. This assumes that the
vectors of change are already in place and that it is simply a
matter of time before we witness regime breakdown. No matter how
astute a leadership, how willing to rule, and how much support it
may still have, it is hard to imagine that it can survive a
complete economic collapse. In early summer 1993, the news from
Cuba consisted of a steady staple of power outages, a generalized
breakdown of transportation, increased scarcity and hunger, and
the threat of epidemics of different sorts. Was a collapse
anywhere near?
The third option anticipates change, but in more gradual
fashion. It rejects unescapable economic determinism and posits
that continued selective application of pragmatic macroeconomic
policies and political repression (the lynchpin of the strategy
of re-equilibration used by the leadership in the early 1990s),
combined with the strategies used by ordinary Cubans to survive
the crisis, may change the regime in a gradual and largely
unanticipated way. It is conceivable that the same or a very
similar ruling group could preserve the ethos of the
revolutionary regime in a new structural configuration.16
Despite the official rhetoric and the supposedly diehard
attitude of the historic leadership, which has vowed to uphold
principle and resist until the end, re-equilibration is no
revival of "Guevarism" but an attempt by the historic leaders to
subordinate the scope and nature of change to their own political
and physical survival. Stated in the language of transition
analysis, this is a "re-equilibration without liberalization."

Therefore, the early 1990s are not simply a repetition of the
late 1960s. Creeping capitalism, the loss of ideological
referents, and deeper and more widespread popular resentment
against the regime are pushing Cuba into uncharted territory.
Cubans may not be ready to immolate themselves to improve
matters, but this does not mean that they will respond
enthusiastically to narrowly-defined policies of elite survival
and regime continuity. In short, elite-guided re-equilibration
and mass-based avoidance and disengagement are the stuff of the
politics of transition in Cuba. What is yet to be determined is
the outcome.
Change in the Cuba of the 1990s.
All the different permutations and combinations of these
three possibilities boil down to two interpretations. The
difference between these interpretations is not whether change
will occur, but whether it is going to be gradual and orderly,
(even if it results in a new or drastically altered regime) or
turbulent, and spin out of control. Which is likely to be the
case?
In 1993, four years after the collapse of the socialist bloc
and two years after its cliency relationship with the Soviet
Union had come to an end, the Cuban regime remained in place. To
be sure, a sense of urgency was palpable in much of the
formulation and implementation of domestic policy. Levels and
styles of citizen mobilization were more reminiscent of the
turmoil and experimentation of the 1960s than of the more
structured and predictable patterns of the late 1970s and early
1980s. Open massive unemployment and underemployment had become a
reality. In its edition of April 2, 1992, the weekly Bohemia
reported that, by that time, about 155,000 workers had been
reassigned to chores in agriculture and construction. By January
1993, roughly 75 percent of Cuban factories had simply stopped
producing anything because of the lack of raw materials. In
agriculture, animal traction had all but replaced tractors and
combines. Workers dining halls were shut down. In spring 1993,
the quota of food that could actually be purchased through the
official rationing system did not cover the entire month. All of
these things seemed to be pulling the regime away from its
blueprint for re-equilibration. Following a very violent storm in
March 1993, the Cuban government broke precedent and asked for
international donations to help repair the very extensive
damages. From that point onward, Cuban officials pointed to
adverse weather conditions as a major contributor to their
inability to fulfill commercial contracts and meet their own
production goals for the "special period." On June 3, 1993,
Alberto Betancourt Roa, director of CUBAZUCAR, announced that due
to force majeure Cuba would have to suspend its sugar deliveries
and that sugar production would not surpass the 4.2 million
metric ton mark. This was very bad news.

Externally, the regime had embarked in a worldwide campaign
aimed at forcing an end to the U.S. economic embargo, first
imposed in 1962. Passage of the Cuban Democracy Act, signed into
law by President George Bush in Miami in October 1992, had
tightened the provisions of the embargo on grounds that this
would accelerate a transition to democracy.17 Cuban officials
were utilizing this stated purpose to denounce the United States.
On their own, most of Cuba's traditional trading partners,
including steadfast U.S. allies (members of NATO and the EEC) and
countries not particularly sympathetic to the regime, denounced
the Act and/or announced countermeasures of their own.18 Even
before final approval of the Act, on October 8th, the European
Community filed a formal complaint with the U.S. Government on
grounds that this violated international law. Canada and the
United Kingdom issued orders imposing fines on any company
complying with the Act. On November 24, 1992, the United Nations
General Assembly approved a non-binding resolution condemning the
expansion of the embargo; only the United States, Romania, and
Israel voted against it. On December 2, 1992, the final
declaration of a meeting of the Group of Eight in Buenos Aires
included language criticizing "attempts to confer
extraterritoriality to the laws of any country." International
controversy about the Cuban Democracy Act put the Cuban problem
back in the venue of the nationalism- imperialism debate, to the
detriment of the reality of a besieged dictatorship steadfastly
refusing to negotiate a reconciliation with its opposition and
determined not to entertain any policy options except its own.
In terms of the relationship between rulers and ruled, there
was a palpable estrangement between state and society, and the
government was increasingly unable to provide services that the
population had grown accustomed to. This, in no small measure,
was a direct result of miscalculations and obstinacy on the part
of the ruling elite, particularly Fidel Castro. But it would be
hard to underestimate the very overwhelming impact of what was
probably the worst economic crisis in the country's history. What
had begun in the mid-1980s as a disguised program of economic
austerity, the so-called "campaign to rectify errors and negative
tendencies" (rectificacion), had evolved into a desperate
struggle for survival which the government euphemistically
described as "a special period in time of peace."
The population's response to these conditions was complex.
On the one hand the kingdom of dissimulation that ordinary Cubans
had built for themselves was giving way to increased social
disorganization, open discontent, and some isolated instances of
formal protest. The crime rate soared as Cubans found it
impossible to make ends meet without engaging in petty thievery.
Expressions of discontent were more open than ever before. For
example, in the municipal elections of December 20, 1992, about
31 percent of the 7,546,194 voters invalidated their ballots or
left them blank. There was increasing disbelief in the
government's insistence that the United States might invade and
that the economic depression that the country was experiencing

was a direct result of the U.S. embargo and the collapse of the
Soviet system. But there was also considerable resentment at the
United States for making things worse by tightening the embargo.
Dissidents ventured where they rarely had gone before,
openly criticizing the regime on live interviews with Miami radio
stations and in statements to international media. The Catholic
Church became more openly critical. In October 1991, Archbishop
Jaime Ortega Alamino asked Cuban Catholics not to join the rapid
reaction brigades organized by the government to intimidate
people and conduct acts of street violence against dissidents and
protesters. In May 1992, Archbishop Ortega criticized the
official media for openly espousing an attitude of "us versus
them" when referring to Cuban Christians. He added,
When we seem to be marching towards a lay state, it is
hardly convenient to continue talking about Marxism as
a religion and about the encounter of Christians and
Marxists as an ecumenical meeting between two churches.
In late October 1992, the Cuban Episcopal Conference issued
a statement condemning the Cuban Democracy Act and reiterated the
opposition of the Catholic hierarchy to the U.S. economic
embargo.
Intra-elite relations seemed to be experiencing considerable
turbulence. Despite official proclamations, the PCC was far from
united. Disunity within the party had been a problem for the past
10 years. In December 1985, due to a lack of consensus on a
number of issues, the last session of the Third Congress of the
PCC had to be postponed. Shortly after concluding its delayed
session, in February 1986, Castro went ahead on his own and
launched the so-called process of rectification on April 19,
1986.
Moreover, there were very complicated maneuvers involving
preparations for the Fourth Congress of the PCC in October 1991.
A number of ad hoc procedures were put in place so that the top
leadership would be able to control the process of delegate
selection and, by implication, the agenda and the debate. On the
one hand, many of the base leaders of the PCC elected by secret
ballot earlier in the year were not considered completely
reliable. But these did not reach the Congress in large numbers.
On the other hand, the llamamiento process, which was the
leadership's call for an open and sincere debate leading to the
Congress produced far too many controversial suggestions. The
Politburo had to issue a declaration clarifying that the
revolutionary project and its historic leadership were beyond
questioning.
Before the Congress ever took
commission implemented a number of
that they would have been approved
of the free peasant market, one of

place, its organizing
important changes on grounds
anyway.19 Even so, the issue
the first and most

controversial aspects of the policy of rectification, was hotly
debated at the insistence of "the right," with many people openly
calling for its restoration. For their part, "left" elements did
not concede the point about the inclusion of believers in the
party without a fight. Structural and personnel changes approved
by the Congress--including the elimination of the Secretariat;
the promotion of "safe" younger politicians (Maria de los Angeles
Garcia, Alfredo Hondal Gonzalez, Alfredo Jordan Morales, Carlos
Lage, Abel Prieto, Roberto Robaina, Nelson Torres Perez),
technocrats, and trouble-shooters (Concepcion Campa Huergo,
Yadira Garcia Vega, Candido Palmero Hernandez) to an expanded
Politburo of 25 members; and the elimination of deputy positions
up and down and across the entire party structure--were not
trivial. If anything, these complex changes were put in place to
help implement the strategy of re-equilibration with which the
government intended to pull the regime out of its state of
deterioration and prevent its breakdown. In addition, the
Congress gave the Politburo carte blanche to rule the country
through exceptional mechanisms for as long as this was made
necessary by the "special period."
What this cursory review of the evidence seems to suggest is
that there has been oppposition in Cuba, but that it has not been
able to establish and consolidate itself either at the level of
the leadership or within the ranks of the mass public. Is this
state of affairs likely to continue? Will the government strategy
of re-equilibration somehow merge with or assimilate some of the
demands of the opposition? Are the dynamics of
officially-sponsored changes and of their unanticipated
consequences likely to complement or collide with each other?
A Socialist Aperture Toward Capitalism.
Changes in the configuration of international political
blocs left the regime scurrying to find not only new trading
partners but also ideological moorings. This posed a
double-barreled threat to its legitimacy. Keeping a trading
economy afloat was a tall order; managing the deepening
contradiction between an official rhetoric of "socialism or
death" and the everyday practice of state capitalism was no
panacea. The top leadership strained to put the best possible
face on this glaring contradiction. In September 1991, President
Fidel Castro stated that Cuba could have both a socialist economy
and society and wide cooperation with foreign capital. In a
November 1992 interview which received national television and
radio coverage, Carlos Lage, secretary of the executive committee
of the Council of Ministers, described current economic policy as
"a socialist opening to the capitalist world." This, he hastened
to add, would not sacrifice the political, economic, and social
project chosen by Cuba.
In short, government policy calls for a mixed economy of
sorts, combining foreign capitalist enclaves, primarily in the

export sector, with socialist production and distribution
predominating in the domestic sector.20 This was an enclave-based
economic restructuring, unaccompanied by political
liberalization.21 It is likely that any successful reorganization
of Cuban political economy will require massive foreign
investment and a reorientation to export-led growth in
nontraditional sectors.22 While this strategy is probably
correct, it poses serious problems of legitimacy to a leadership
that has made the rejection of capitalism and market economics a
central tenet of its economic model.23
Two additional problems loom large. One is that, despite
very generous terms and facilities offered to foreign capital,
the latter has yet to take full advantage of them. While the
amount of foreign investment received thus far is substantial, it
is insufficient to pull the country out of its deep recession and
to make the official strategy of re-equilibration successful. By
spring 1993, there were close to 300 foreign firms already
operating in Cuba, including giants like BASF, Bayer, CIBA-GEIGY,
Komatsu, Nissei Sangyo, Rhone-Poulenc, Sandoz, and Volvo.24 But
many had yet to make an investment commitment, and new investment
remained heavily concentrated. For example, in 1992, reports of a
massive infusion of fresh Canadian capital used the figure of
U.S. $1.2 billion to describe what Sherrit Gordon intended to
invest in modernizing nickel plants at Las Camariocas and Punta
Gorda.
Linkages between these new resources/activities and Cuban
foreign trade and domestic economic activity remained tenuous.
One major factor was its enclave nature. Another was the collapse
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which took
the lion's share of Cuba's trade. In 1984-89, Cuban exports to
and imports from CMEA countries were roughly 70 percent of the
total. (See Table 1.) In dollar terms, the amount of Cuban
imports from the Soviet Union was U.S. $5.2 billion in 1989. This
dropped to $1.7 in 1991. Accordingly, the Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) reported that, between 1989 and 1992, Cuban
import capacity had declined by 73 percent.25 As a result of this
drastically reduced import capacity, Cuba's Gross Social Product
fell precipitously as vital imports could not be purchased
elsewhere because of a lack of foreign exchange and Cuba's low
credit rating. (The latter was due to its unilateral moratorium
on servicing its foreign debt with hard-currency countries in
1986.) Input shortages had a serious impact on all Cuban
industry. Sugar production declined from 8.1 million metric tons
in 1989-90 to 4.2 million in 1992-93.
Whatever trade this new investment is generating with the
Western Hemisphere and Europe cannot come close to filling the
void left by the Soviet Union and the CMEA. During 1984 to 1989,
Cuban export trade with the Western hemisphere moved from 2 to
4.6 percent of total exports and from 4.4 to 6.3 percent of total
imports. While these figures cover years preceding the
vertiginous free fall of the Cuban economy, they show the

enormous gap left by the disappearance of the CMEA. This cannot
be filled by new trading partners in a short period of time.

Second, the very generous terms offered by the Cuban
government have two negative effects in the short term. One is
that Cuban participation in profits is but a fraction of what it
could be if the country did not find itself in such a weak
position. While this varied somewhat from one sector to another,
and from one joint venture to the next, in essence what prevailed
was a buyer's market. Extensive concessions in taxation, profit
repatriation, and the provision of infrastructure reduced
national participation in the surplus generated by these
activities and deflated the net diffusion effects of this
investment in the domestic sector. For example, according to a
March 1993 report by Cuba's Grupo de Turismo, tourism generated
U.S. $530 million in gross revenues in 1992. This compared
favorably with the U.S. $145 million generated by the sector in
1987 and the U.S. $387 million in 1991. In addition, the sector
accounted for roughly 62,000 jobs or 1.6 percent of total
employment in 1992. These are all impressive numbers. But
according to several estimates, Cuba only netted U.S. $245
million in 1992 once profits, commissions, transportation
expenses and direct imports into the sector were discounted.26
What this means is that this high-priority sector, which seems to
be performing fairly well, cannot be counted on to produce
miracles or quick fixes. Major gains will require a sustained
effort and adaptability to changing market conditions to remain
competitive.
In summary, Canadian, Spanish, Mexican, Japanese, and other
investors cannot save the regime. Something more is required.
Consequently, following the inauguration of Bill Clinton in
January 1993, the Cuban government launched a strong public
relations campaign to shame his administration into easing the
embargo or abrogating it altogether.
The other negative aspect of Cuba's generous concessions to
new foreign investment is in the area of labor and community
relations. Although these remained enclave operations, their
social and political aspects posed a direct challenge to the
legitimacy of the regime. The contrast between foreign capitalist
affluence and domestic socialist mediocrity is just too strong at
all levels. For example, concerning tourism, criticism has
emerged from within the party itself over the system of apartheid
created by the increasing number of foreign tourists visiting the
island, which has resulted in the virtual exclusion of the
criollos from the choice spots in the littoral, and has put extra
pressure on the supply of food in the country. Cubans are
practically excluded from the "dollar area," and ordinary
citizens cannot make purchases in well-supplied stores reserved
for foreign tourists, entrepreneurs, and diplomats. More
ominously, prostitution, which Cuban officials had proudly
declared extinct 30 years ago, has reappeared as a direct result
of the upsurge in tourism and of the increasingly narrow
employment opportunities available to a predominantly young and
technically well-qualified labor force. In addition, hundreds of

young technicians and professionals are avidly seeking jobs in
the dollarized sector of the economy. This is an internal "brain
drain" of sorts.
But employment in the dollar sector entails having to adjust
to more demanding conditions than many Cuban workers are
accustomed to. The government's monopoly of the domestic labor
market, and the fact that it acts as intermediary between foreign
capitalists and Cuban workers, creates additional frictions.
While some major irritants have been removed, most workers
continue to be paid in Cuban pesos at a fraction of their nominal
dollar salaries. They cannot engage in collective bargaining and,
until recently, they could not use whatever dollars came into
their hands to patronize restricted shops. Despite these
annoyances and outright injustices, workers in the dollarized
foreign enclaves are considered lucky by those excluded from
them.
A recent study of the impact of this early onslaught of
enclave capitalism concludes somewhat tentatively. According to
this work, while direct foreign investment is undermining Castro
in several ways, this is being countered by other effects that
may actually help consolidate the system, particularly if foreign
investment increases.27 This and other sources are beginning to
discover antagonisms between Cuban managers in joint enterprises,
enjoying more autonomy, salaries, and working conditions, and
those trying to run state enterprises under all kinds of
vicissitudes.
Some Likely Scenarios.
On the surface, it appears that the almost legendary
adaptability of the historic revolutionary leaders has not
deserted them. Through a combination of official policies, astute
manipulation of certain factors specific to the Cuban situation,
and the adroit turning of some unfavorable contingencies to their
advantage, they have managed to disconnect potential links
between would-be leaders and followers, and thereby prevent
discontent from turning into political mobilization and massified
opposition.
While these conditions prevail, Castro has no incentive to
engage in serious bargaining and negotiation with his Cuban
opponents. He can continue his present course hoping that he may
finesse an accommodation with the United States, that his ad hoc
economic policies will mature and bear full fruit, and that the
number of imponderables shall remain a manageable few. Given the
trends afoot in mid-1993, this is probably too much for him to
ask. As suggested above, he needs major qualitative changes in
terms of access to fresh credit and really major levels of direct
foreign investment to jumpstart a restructured economy and put it
in the path of self-sustained growth. This is unlikely without
some major changes in the domestic configuration and

international relations of the regime.
While a relaxation of the U.S. embargo remained possible-particularly with respect to food, medicine, travel, and
communications--there was very little to indicate that, short of
drastic change in the nature of the regime, the United States
would abrogate it altogether. Absent this, Castro's own
idiosyncracies and concern for his own political survival are
likely to prevent him from allowing the more drastic and rapid
conversion to market mechanisms that the Cuban economy requires
to be able to feed and employ the population, particularly in the
absence of a new external patron. In either case, with or without
a patron, and even barring any new complication, the vicious
circle in which the Cuban economy is trapped is likely to get
even worse. In other words, Castro will have to make some
additional concessions on the economic front.
Elite and popular reactions to these concessions are hard to
gauge. Dissent on economic policy alone is not likely to fracture
the elite in a regime-threatening fashion, whether to demand or
protest changes. However, the issue of repressing the population,
which could arise if economic conditions continue to deteriorate
unremittingly, would probably produce such a split. Absent a
sustained dialogue with the opposition or a previous tacit elite
agreement, this split may not bring about a crucial realignment
of forces or the emergence of a new winning coalition capable of
managing a transition. But it would force the regime to engage in
continued repression of spontaneous, sustained popular protest.
Ironically, given extant mechanisms of political control,
spontaneous protest may be more likely and, with the absence of
prior elite agreements and clearly formulated alternatives, the
potential for violence and anarchy will increase.
In the short term, however, there are no likely candidates
to play the role of connecting the elite and masses into a
coherent opposition. Military officers are less likely to lead a
dissenting faction and to play a prominent role in managing the
transition than the party apparatchiki. The existence of only one
party makes it easier for the politics of dissent to become the
politics of opposition within that party, than for a military
conspiracy to crystallize. A military coalition would require the
active collaboration of the intelligence apparatus, which was
effectively gutted and purged in the aftermath of the Ochoa
affair. At present, the MININT is under the receivership of a
trustee of FAR Minister Raul Castro, General Abelardo Colome
Ibarra.
For the most part, the present leadership of the dissident
movement has not made any decisive move to mobilize the
population; those who have tried to recruit more aggressively,
such as Yndamiro Restano of the Movimiento Armonia, have quickly
found themselves in jail. Those who remain free do not seem to be
contemplating a change of tactics; therefore, it does not appear
that they will lead an active campaign of civil disobedience any

time soon.
Without a leadership willing to lead, there may not be a
mass willing to follow. The strategies of survival evolved over
the years are not likely to be revised at a time of extreme
hardship and duress. People are just too preoccupied and busy
with subsistence to engage in the kind of spontaneous combustion
that might produce a massive blow up. Cubans have always worried
about not becoming martyred in sterile causes; consequently,
there is quite a lot of apprehension about "starting anything."
On the other hand, Cubans are also known to mobilize by anger in
the face of blatant injustice and abuse of power. It is not out
of the question that we could witness incidents of looting
diplomercados, hotel commissaries or even local groceries. It is
also likely that mistreatment of ordinary citizens by an abusive
official or mob could spark violence.
Castro may know more about the psychology of ordinary Cubans
than the rest of us but, in the early 1990s, those Cubans posed a
greater potential threat to him than anyone at the elite level.
He demonstrated his concern by vigorously campaigning during the
weeks leading up to the election of February 1993. He cannot rest
on his laurels, however. He is spread too thin over too many
projects and crises. Soon he may be confronted by the most
difficult choice of his career: whether to preside over a more
genuine process of change or eventually have to engage in massive
repression of ordinary citizens.
In conclusion, given the very narrow margins for success of
the present strategy of re-equilibration, the prospects for the
future seem to cluster around two options. One is a deepening of
the process of change, led by the government; the other is the
continuation of current policy, with increasing chances of
violence and turmoil. That Fidel Castro remained the key player
in determining which of the two courses would prevail seemed to
suggest which was more likely. That he has never put his
supremacy on the auction block does not augur well for the future
of his country.
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